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Saints?
(in lieu of a preface)
Anthony J. Graybosch
1 There is  a  sharp contrast  between the importance of  the individual  in  the ethics  of
William James and John Dewey. James is less modern and more religious in the traditional
sense than Dewey, more in line with the radical individualism of Emerson and Thoreau.
And James’ closer approximation to Emerson has consequences for his ethics, philosophy
of religion, and metaphysics. Here I focus on the importance of individual personality,
psychology, and feelings of significance in exemplary individuals as a means of driving a
philosophical wedge between James and Dewey.
 
Religious Individuals
2 Consider Dewey’s suggestion that the word ‘God’ mean “the ideal ends that at a given
time and place one acknowledges as having authority over his volition and emotion, the
values to which one is supremely devoted, as far as these ends, through imagination, take
on unity”  (Dewey  1934:  56).  On  the  face  of  it,  this  is  a  nice  enough definition.  But
Deweyian ideals are not yet realized and so move an individual beyond imagination into
acion. And few worthy ideals, if any, are capable of individual realization even by the
most  impressive  politicians.  The  religious,  including  religious  experience,  formerly
associated with solitary walks across “a bare commons” is now associated by Dewey with
participation in an active relationship devoted to the growth of  the ideal  within the
world.  Religious experience is  preserved and tapped,  just  transferred from individual
mystical  union  with  the  gods  of  religions,  or  nature,  to  association  with  “normal
manifestations that take place at certain rhythmic points in the movement of existence”
(Dewey 1934: 31). Dewey opposes exclusive preoccupation, either by supernaturalism or
atheism,  with  “man  in  isolation”  (Dewey  1934:  57).  And  Deweyian  ideals  function
independently of the metaphysical existence of these ideals. In other words, an existing
god is  not needed to give ideals  effective force in life and,  if  anything,  belief  in the
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existence of a god to guarantee the eventual existence of ideals would foster a false, and
perhaps self-defeating, optimism.
3 One interesting aspect of Dewey’s view of ideals may go unnoticed, unity. Personal ideals
should produce a unity of character as well as a unity of action. Such unity seems clearly
at odds with how most of us live our lives, and desire to live them. My interests in the
Rolling  Stones,  model  railways,  Ferdinand  Leger,  Knut  Hamsun,  and  baseball  have
authority over my volitions and emotions but hardly give unity to my life, personality, or
values. In instances where conflict of values arise – stay in Gdynia to observe the visit of
the pope or drive to Imst to see the Stones – which option was conducive to unity did not
even occur to me. And that sort of looseness of fit is certainly common to many people we
value  in  our  lives.  Dewey’s  approach  to  ideals  leans  toward  lives  devoted  to  social
reconstruction, long term cooperative loyalties, the priority of moral ideals, and a search
for some sort of unity in the ideals that organize our lives. Dewey allows for a plurality of
ideals but not ideals which do not reinforce each other.
4 The ideals of historical religions, or the mores of cultures if the reader prefers, are not
often given in a  purely moral  framework or function in a  way to foster  each other.
Religions  generally  involve  positivity,  the  valuing  of  what  lacks  an  intrinsic  moral
dimension until elevated by a divine command. And the moral imperatives of a religion
do not seek for unity in ideals so much as some sort of full coverage of the activities of life
with an emotive tinge.  But this  sort  of  religion is not one Dewey can be friendly to
because it points toward a divine command theory, there can be no divine command
theory without a commander, and a commander undermines the functioning of ideals in
life.
5 I am not concerned in this paper with the nature of an individual so much as to contrast
the relative importance of private realization of experiences of value in the constitution
of an exemplary life. I do not mean to suggest that Dewey, and his associates, place no
value on such private experiences but rather that there is an important difference in
emphasis  between  Dewey  and  the  earlier  American  philosophers  (ordinarily  seen  as
forerunners of  pragmatism such as Thoreau and Emerson) and,  of  course,  in William
James. And to make this point I will soon turn to turn to James’ discussion of saints.James
talked of saints, and Dewey can best be contrasted through his reconstruction of faith and
objection to religious individualism.
 
Embracing the Dark Side
6 Susan Wolf’s definition of a moral saint and her delineation of two types of saints in
common sense will be helpful here. A moral saint is as morally good as possible. Loving
saints and rational saints differ in primary motivation. The Loving Saint is motivated by
happiness in acting for others while the Rational Saint acts according to duty based in
intellectual principle. Wolf objects to pursuing moral perfection as a “model of personal
well being.” One reason is that moral virtues crowd out the non moral ones and fosters a
barren life.  Saints  are  not  known for  wit.  And they may be  found working  in  soup
kitchens but are rarely gourmet cooks. Besides crowding out non moral ideals, stifling the
development of non moral talents, moral saints also do not inspire us. And when they do
inspire us  it  tends to be for some non moral  idiosyncratic  characteristic  (Wolf  1982:
419-23).
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7 There are deeper reasons for devaluing moral saints. Wolf points out that the lack of a
well rounded personality is an objection that could be brought against anyone devoted to
an ideal, moral or non moral. The problem with the moral saint is that morality is seen as
a higher order ideal, higher than say devotion to soccer or art. This prioritizing of the
moral leads many to suspect that loving saints lack appreciation for things with non
moral value and that rational saints have the appreciation but are afraid to indulge. And,
of course, lack of appreciation for the pleasures in life and fear of such pleasures make
the saintly life less than ideal. Wolf remarks, “The way in which morality, unlike other
possible goals, is apt to dominate is particularly disturbing, for it seems to require either
the lack or the denial of the existence of an identifiable, personal self” (Wolf 1982: 424).
8 In addition to this lack of a self, the moral saint is suspect because of conflict with our
judgment of the value of others. Most admirable people are not saints. Of course, the
temptation is to say that they are admirable for non moral reasons. But our judgment
says they are admirable for pursuing a life in which moral value is not dominant. Saints
also are suspect for having one thought too many too often. What they value and act on is
informed by a moral ideal and not primarily by appreciation of natural value. And finally,
the defender of moral saints who tries to limit moral obligation to make room in life for
other non moral ideals will find herself devising artificial limits to moral obligation given
the moral saint’s prioritizing of moral value (Wolf 1982: 433-4)
9 Individuals who are as morally good as possible do not provoke admiration and imitation
because  there  are  non  moral virtues  which  are  overwhelmed  by  moral  ideals.  The
dominance of the moral produces individuals whose lives are perceived as not worth
living by others, and even if we admire such individuals we do not wish to reproduce
them. For instance, I would not want to raise a child who approximated to the life of
Mother Theresa because I  would never see the child.  Moral  saints  lack a  breadth of
character and so strike us as boring.  And they make weak companions because they
either do not value the same things as we do or value the same things for different, more
moral,  reasons.  And,  if  these  saints  turn  philosophical,  they  become  unnatural
companions because their values move them outside the unreflected life to the reflected
one. The parent who finds himself playing sports with a child in order to contribute to
the greatest good or fulfill a duty is an unfortunate person.
10 So, whatever an exemplary life is, it will not be able to accommodate the goal of being as
moral as possible.  This,  I  think,  was Wolf’s main point and can be accommodated by
James’ ethics, but not Dewey’s. The exemplary individual may lack unity with society,
unity  among  moral  ideals,  unity  among  moral  and  non  moral  ideals,  and  unity  of
personality. In short, such an individual is prone to whims. Emerson claimed, “[…] the
only right is what is after my own constitution; the only wrong what is against it.” But
Emerson quickly adds the problematic side constraint – “Your goodness must have some
edge to it, else it is none. The doctrine of hatred must be preached, as the counteraction
of the doctrine of love, when that pules and whines.” When reminded of his moral duty to
“put all poor men in good situations” Emerson responds, “Are they my poor?” He rejects
being virtuous as a moral penance. “I do not wish to expiate, but to live. My life is for
itself and not for a spectacle.” And inconsistency is celebrated with the admonition to
speak your mind today and not be ashamed to openly contradict yourself the next day
(Emerson 1841: 179-82).
11 Emerson’s model of an exemplary life rejects the dominance of moral values. It locates
the source of value, and it hierarchy, in the individual. Of course, we are tempted to see
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the individual  as  a  social  construct  but  Emerson was from a different  tradition,  one
embracing particular individual revelation and his sense of beauty is a half secularized
version of Edwards’ predetermined sense of the heart. Even if the individual is largely
constructed  by  social  conditions,  fate  in  Emerson’s  terms,  the  felt  quality  of  values
intensifies in non conforming to inherited values. At the least, Emerson rejects the notion
that what a person spontaneously values needs to be justified by or modified to fit social
norms.
12 His assertion that goodness must have an edge is problematic because it points in so
many  directions.  Perhaps  it  merely  means  that  values  must  not  be  motivated  by
conformity;  I  would  rather  think  that  he  knew  human personality  is  a  complex  of
inconsistent  motivations  which  contribute  in  alteration  and  tension  to  producing
exemplary individuals. The other quotes point away from the dominance of moral values
making the self a home for a variety of values. And the approval of inconsistency further
recognizes that unity of personality is  overrated.  I  titled this section “embracing the
darkside” because I take Emerson’s recognition of the edge as acknowledgement that it is
neither possible nor desirable to remove the wealth of values in human personality. Of
course it reminds us of his remark that he hoped his natural values did not come from the
devil. But it is more important to see him as valuing individuals for their preservation of
the wild. With Emerson in mind, his rejection of moral, psychological, and value unity, it
is time to turn to James.
 
James on Ethics and God
13 James’  characterization of  the psychology of  saints is  that spiritual  emotions are the
habitual  centre  of  personal  energy  (James  1982:  271).  Individuality  is  rooted  in  the
“differing susceptibilities  of  emotional  excitement,  and in the different  impulses  and
inhibitions these bring in their train” (James 1982: 261). James holds that when emotions
reach a level of excitability they overcome all obstacles. His saint, like the loving saint, is
all about motivation. But the motivation is not so much toward happiness as to “break
something.”  The  strenuous  life,  and  the  life  of  the  saint  is  a  strenuous  one,  is
characterized by earnestness – living with energy even if it brings pain. The saint lives
from this religious centre which makes her immune to other values in pursuit of the ideal
life (James 1982: 267).
14 But what is the ideal life, the life of a saint? One aspect James emphasizes is that the
religious  life  is  private,  it  involves  feelings  experienced by concrete  individuals.  The
experiences and conduct of saints are the same across religions, which means that the
theological beliefs of respective religions are irrelevant to saints. By experiences James
means the occasions of religious experience and also the heightened sense of purpose and
beauty felt by religious individuals. By conduct he means the exercise of virtues such as
poverty  and asceticism.  Both  experience  and conduct  are  discussed  at  length  in  his
Varieties  of  Religious  Experience.  And  some  of  his  descriptions  of  historical  saints  are
enjoyable, for instance, pointing out that Saint Theresa was more energetic in expression
than in feeling (James 1982: 347).
15 James and Dewey share a distinction of religion from the religious, but James preserves
the ties of religious experience to individual salvation. The worth of a so called saint’s life
appears retrospectively to depend on currently accepted views of god (James 1982: 354).
“Today,  rightly  or  wrongly,  helpfulness  in  general  human  affairs  is  […]  deemed  an
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essential element of worth in character; and to be of some public or private use is also
reckoned as a species of divine service” (James 1982: 354). But the essence of saintliness is
in  passions  which  are  channeled  in  different  direction  in  different  social  contexts.
“Taking refuge in monasteries was as much an idol of the tribe in the middle ages, as
bearing a hand in the world’s work is today” (James 1982: 371).
16 James includes three beliefs among the essential aspects of a religious life: that a spiritual
universe exists,  that humans have a natural purpose to find unity with that spiritual
universe, and that prayer is efficacious. Those who live religiously experience a “zest” of
life, a sense of security, a life at peace with others, and an enchantment with ordinary life
(James 1982: 505). “We and God have business with each other; and in opening ourselves
to his influence our deepest destiny is fulfilled” (James 1982: 516-7). Given his reflections
on the shortcomings of historical saints like Theresa and his acceptance that what counts
as  saintly  behavior  is  largely  a  matter  relative  to a  particular  social  context  we are
justified in wondering just what would count as a saintly life. And James answers in terms
of felt feelings primarily.
17 This is where the loving saint and rational saint contrast can help us. Each of these is an
intellectual formulation of different aspects of the common sense notion of someone who
is as moral as possible. As intellectual formulations they look, from the common sense
point of view, to suffer from one too many beliefs. These saints are moral for a reason.
And once the reason is formulated then they are left with no non arbitrary means of
limiting the dominance of moral ideals over other ideals. The spontaneous saint may lack
moral merit from the intellectual point of view, and be boring from the common sense
point of view, but at least that person lives as one person among others.
18 In “Is Life Worth Living?” published in 1895 James selected Walt Whitman as his example
of  temperamental  optimism and then remarks,  “Some men seem launched upon the
world even from their birth with souls as incapable of happiness as Walt Whitman’s was
of gloom […]” (James 2000: 219-21). If Whitman’s optimism could be seen as religious then
he could serve as an example of the common sense saint. And in some historical periods
he could be seen that way though not in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century
where saints must be of some use to society. But James was concerned more with the
pessimist in this essay and presents pessimism as a religious disease which “consists in
nothing but a religious demand to which there comes no normal religious reply. […] The
nightmare view of life has plenty of organic sources; but its great reflective source has at
all times been the contradiction between the phenomena of nature and the craving of the
heart to believe that behind nature there is a spirit whose expression nature is” (James
2000: 225). James recognizes various naturalistic responses that make life worth living
including  Whitman’s  temperamental  optimism,  idle  curiosity,  the  satisfaction  gained
from imposing a degree of justice on a non moral world. But his preferred solution is the
exercise of the will to believe in a spiritual realm which, he thinks, generates a higher
optimism than the temperamental one of people like Whitman. So, then which of the
more reflective saints, the utilitarian leaning loving or the Kantian leaning rational, does
James select as the exemplar of a superior individual living a worthwhile life?
19 The answer, based on the 1891 “The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life” has to be
neither. There James argues that there can be no ethical theory in advance of the last
person  expressing  a  value  preference.  What  James  offers  is  a  combination  of  an
intuitionist view with a divine command theory. His combination accommodates his view
that there can be a naturalistic ethics and also allows him to present a divine command
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theory  based  in  expression  of  value  preferences.  His  view is  that  in  the  absence  of
sentient creatures there is no value in one natural state of the world over another. But
the existence of one sentient creature creates preferences and so value. A world with one
sentient creature is a moral solitude in which values are generated in a godlike fashion.
The only value conflicts such a person would be faced with perhaps would be generated
by a desire for some sort of consistency in values.
20 The position is intuitionist in two sense: values are generated via preferences arising
naturally in the individual and some of these preferences are not generated by natural
states such as utility. James’ example is the sense of honor (James 2000: 244). A world with
many sentient creatures will  generate value conflicts and James offers criticisms of a
variety of ethical theories that have been advanced as candidates for the one ethics. It is
not essential to my paper to rehearse these criticisms here. It is enough to point out that
for James wherever there is a claim there is an obligation. “[…] we see not that without a
claim actually made by some concrete person there can be no obligation, but that there is some
obligation wherever there is a claim” (James 2000: 249, italics in original). Given James’ love
of dogs we should take claim in an extended sense not requiring language. He remarks,
“Take any demand, however slight, which any creature, however weak, may make. Ought
it not, for its own sole sake, to be satisfied? If not, prove why not” (James 2000: 249).
James is not shifting the burden of proof here because he thinks he has already pointed
out the shortcomings of rival ethical theories and left opponents only with an option to
express a preference.
21 One approach James takes to resolving conflicts of preferences is to say that we ought to
satisfy as many demands as possible. This allows for an ethics without god, although it is
second best to his religious view. It also is unstable because James thinks of ethics as “life
answering  to  life”  and  if  there  is  no  response  to  a  demand  there  is  no  principled
argument available to generate a response.  Admittedly James urges tolerance toward
values we do not share; but “hands off” is not the same thing as working actively to
satisfy such demands. This lack of emotive pull in naturalistic ethics, what James called
the religion of humanity, comes to the forefront out when he considers the claims of
remote posterity. “We do not love these men of the future keenly enough; and we love
them perhaps the less the more we hear of their evolutionized perfection” (James 2000:
261).
22 It is no surprise that given the relativity James attaches to the notion of a saint that he
also thinks there is nothing final in any “actually given hierarchy of ideals” (James 2000:
257). And so James’ ethics looks like a lake in which many demands swim around with no
priority attached to their satisfaction except that given by those sentient creatures on
shore. And there is no priority given to a cooperative satisfaction or cooperative effort.
What he does remark is that if some preferences were given divine backing those would
not be more worthy but rather strike the responsive person as more worthy.  James’
argument for the religious approach to life is ultimately psychological: “[…] in a merely
human world without a God, the appeal to our moral energy falls short of its maximal
stimulating power. […] When, however, we believe that a God is there, and that he is one
of the claimants, the infinite perspective opens out. […] The more imperative ideals now
begin to speak with an altogether new objectivity and significance […]” (James 2000: 261).
23 James’ assertion of the superiority of a divine command approach will strike advocates of
“the religion of humanity” as reactionary at best. And perhaps he is empirically incorrect
about  the  effect  of  religious  belief  on  the  psychological  life  of  believers.  But,
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philosophically, I think we can now see clearly the chasm separating the Dewey strand in
the pragmatic tradition from that culminating in James.  James places the source and
selection of values more firmly in the self than in community. And the existence of a god
that conveys a degree of optimism about efforts to conform the world to a person’s values
make a major difference to James. And when values are selected for priority in life they
are selected on the basis of a perceived ordering from another individual. And the values
selected must convey a personal religious experience to each person. And, finally, given
the relativity of values to each person or sentient creature, the person who is the source
of the value hierarchy in James’ ethics must accommodate a wealth of conflicting values.
This person must be some sort of divine Walt Whitman quoted at length in the 1899 “On a
Certain Blindness in Human Beings” who enjoys the spectacle of life riding the trolley on
Broadway from 23rd Street to Bowling Green or loafing on the corner (James 2000: 278).
 
So Who would be a Jamesian Saint?
24 James tells us that differences in those aspects of human life connected to social class do
not matter in God’s eye.  “Thus are men’s lives leveled up as well  as leveled down, –
leveled up in their common inner meaning, leveled down in their outer gloriousness and
show”  (James  2000:  292).  The  significant  life is  more  local,  more  about  paying  the
mortgage than ending global warming for James. What it requires is that each person
organize a portion of life around an ideal conceived intellectually. That ideal needs to be
novel for that person and needs to be pursued strenuously (James 2000: 299-300). And, for
James,  the  least  important  of  the  three  aspects  of  the  significant  life  is  intellectual
formulation of the ideal. It seems like, for James, production of a life of religious feeling
and conduct that involves strenuous effort is more important than the ideal selected.
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ABSTRACTS
When one of this journal’s editors asked me to edit an issue and told me I would select the topic,
the  idea  of  dedicating  papers  to  the  question  of  individuals  immediately  came  to  mind.
Pragmatism has such a social orientation in the current literature that it seems that individuals
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get left behind. But the question of the nature of individuals, and especially how much of the
good life  should be  left  to  individual  contemplation,  has occupied pragmatists  at  least  since
Emerson. I have selected and arranged the contributions so that, to me, they speak to each other.
And I see no need to offer a traditional preface to the volume in which I tell readers what the
authors will tell them in their own words better than I. Instead I offer my own thoughts on the
nature of exemplary individuals and on why the question is important in contrasting Dewey and
James on religious experience and questions of metaphysics. And although I do not spend any
real time in the essay on Emerson and Thoreau, I would align them more with James than Dewey.
I tried hard not to use the word ‘community’ in my essay. Why focus on James? Personally I have
always wanted to write something dealing with the Varieties of  Religious Experience.  It  was
suggested to me by my favorite undergraduate teacher Robert O’Connell in 1969 and I got around
to reading it in 1990. It’s an especially odd book, the most personal writing of an author inclined
to  honest  expression.  Even  James  expressed  embarrassment  at  the  amount  of  emotion  it
contained. Once again, thanks to the editors for allowing me to select and arrange these papers.
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